Iran's Policy towards the United States - Part 3
When Shuster attempted to secure the services of a Major Stokes to head the Treasury- Gendarmerie, both Britain and Russia jointly threatened to invade Iran for this presumed violation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. As the Russian troops crossed the Iranian frontier, the Majlis adopted, on 2 November 1911, a resolution reiterating confidence in Shuster. On 29 November, Russia, supported by Britain, delivered the second ultimatum, with a 48-hour limit, demanding (1) dismissal of the Shuster mission; (2) commitment by Iran not to engage foreign subjects without first obtaining the consent of the Russian and the British legations; and (3) payment by Iran of an indemnity to defray the expenses of the Russian troops invading Iran.
Although the Russian troops in Iran were threatening to seize all the northern provinces, the Majlis voted unanimously to reject the ultimatum. The cabinet resigned, but soon it foisted a coup d'etat against the Majlis and expelled the deputies from the house of parliament.
Morgan Shuster was compelled to leave Iran on 11 January 1912, exactly eight months after he had arrived. However, he became a national hero and his expulsion continued to exert strong influence on nationalist sentiments and Iranian foreign policy for many decades to come. Indeed, in 1917 and again in 1921 Iran requested the United States for Shuster's services. But both times the Americans declined to recommend him, in deference to Britain's sensibilities. Even after the downfall of the czarist regime, the department would not recommend Shuster in order to avoid antagonizing Great Britain. On the other hand, the Shuster episode aroused American public opinion about the plight of Iran under overwhelming Anglo-Russian pressure. For the first time, Iran assumed an important international image before the public. In the words of one American observer, Iran "emerged as a brave though hopelessly weak victim of power politics."
World War I and the peace conference - The geographic location of Iran once more proved calamitous for the country during the First World War. Although Iran had declared its neutrality on 1 November 1914, the belligerents - Russia, Great Britain, and Turkey - found ample cause to violate Iranian neutrality. Conscious of its own defenseless situation, Iran appealed to the United States, but America was hardly in a position to alter' the course of the war.
Hostilities between the Anglo-Russian armies, on the one side, and the Turkish forces, on the other, continued on Iranian soil, in the western and northwestern parts of the country. These caused widespread havoc and hardship for the people. The prolongation of the warfare, the forcible requisitioning by the belligerents of the scanty local foodstuffs and fuel materials, together with a succession of unusu4ly severe winters, proved catastrophic. Hundreds of thousands of people died of violencc, starvation, and disease.
It was an experience of apocalyptic proportions, whose impact can be understood only by those few who are still alive today to remember the starkly deplorable conditions of World War I. A British historian admits that Iran "had been exposed to violations and sufferings not endured by any other neutral country."
Consequently, Iran, confronted by the immediate problems of relief and rehabilitation far beyond its resources, once more appealed to the United States; this time for a loan of $2 million for famine relief. The Department urged private relief societies in America to respond, and a most generous response flowed through these channels. With the missionaries in the lead, an extensive relief organization (Persian Relief Committee) was established in 1916, under the chairmanship of the American minister in TeIrran. In the United States, a fund-raising agency (American Persian Relief Comrnission), under the directorship of President Judson of the University of Chicago, collected more than $2,250,000 (a considerable sum in those days) for relief and welfare. Through additional American fmancing, seed-grains were imported from India. Further appropriations were allocated by the American Red Cross. In November 1918, the Iranian foreign minister expressed the gratitude of his government to the United States that the generous American aid had brought the two peoples closer together than ever before.
During the early years of the war, the United States drew a clear distinction between its official policy of non-interference and Iran's transactions with private American organizations and firms. For instance in 1916, when Sultan Ahmad Shah requested asylum for his own person in the U.S. legation in TeIrran, he was refused. Subsequently, when he requested permission to hoist the American flag over his palace, he was refused again. Also, in 191 ~ 15, when the Iranian government approached the United States for a confidential loan of $10 million, the State Department preferred that the request be handled through private concerns. The crown jewels were to serve as collateral for this loan. Another secret proposal of the Iranian government for the sale of the crown jewels was referred to a private jewelry fmm. These secret negotiations were cut short in May 1916 when the Anglo-Russian governments jointly established absolute control over Iranian finances.
After the October Revolution in Russia and the entry of the United States into the war, American policy with respect to Iran began to change gradually. On the one hand, the anxiety of the State Department about the safety of the missionaries in northwest Iran was considerably relieved after they had moved to southern Iran. On the other hand,the United States became increasingly anxious about the possible effects of German propaganda in Iran. With these factors in mind, the State Department, in January 1918, assured the Iranian government that the United States strongly sympathized with Iran's desire to maintain its freedom and sovereignty, and that America would not be a party to any act infringing upon them. This statement was published in Tehran newspapers. In reply, the foreign minister of Iran denied rumors that his government intended to join the war on the side of the Central Powers. But he complained bitterly about the An~o-Russian treatment of Iran.
As for the British policy, Great Britain had already started shifting away from the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovst (13 March 1918) by which socialist Russia withdrew from the war against the Central Powers. In January 1 91 8, the British government recommended to the United States that it send military officers to Iran for the training of the Iranian army. Also, it proposed that the United States should associate itself with the British postwar plans for Iran. The United States replied that the Iranian government had been made aware of America's sympathy with Iran's desire for independence and that a joint declaration with Britain might be misunderstood in Iran. The meaning of the message was clear.
Before the end of the war, the Constitutionalist leaders of Iran had become preoccupied with the question of Iran's participation at an eventual peace conference. They hoped that through such participation Iran might be able not only to receive compensation for the enormous losses and sufferings it had incurred during the war but also to stave off British plans for a protectorate over the country. The British already had plans for the annexation of Mesopotamia to their empire.
In January 1917, the Iranian minister in Washington wrote to the State Department that Iran relied upon the United States to right the wrongs inflicted upon it, and that Iran looked for American assistance "whenever a peace conference shall take place." Secretary of State Robert Lansing took "due note." In December1917, the Iranian minister submitted amemorandum to the State Department, which set forth in detail the depredations of the belligerents in Iran. It requested the assistance of the United States to secure representation for Iran at the conference. Attached to the note was a list of iran's post-war objectives. Secretary Lansing's reply was sympathetic but noncommittal. In October 1918, the Iranian charge d'affaires again presented to the State Department additional documents describing the extent of Iran's wartime losses. He expressed the hope that America's great principles of humanity and justice would be applied in the case of Iran after the war. The request was repeated shortly after the armistice agreement.
In December 1918, the foreign minister of Iran submitted to the American minister in Tehran a note which was forwarded to the U.S. mission ~t the Paris Peace Conference. It expressed the hope that the United States would sponsor, on Iran's behalf in the conference, the following Iranian demands: membership and participation at the peace conference; political and economic independence for Iran; abolition of treaties and customs agreements which violated the integrity of the nation; reconsideration of all the treaties and agreements to which Iran was a party, abrogation of capitulations, and freedom for Iran to enter into new commercial treaties and agreements and to revise tariffs, and reparation of boundaries.
An American writer on U.S.-Iranian relations of this period states that Iran's appeal to the United States reflected accurately public opinion in Iran. Wilsonian idealism offered great hope to the Iranian people. The American charge d'affaires in Tehran reported to the State Department: "Since the end of the war more thought has been given to the regeneration of Persia and all seem to turn instinctively to America for help... in the rebuilding of the country. In a sense, Iran seemed to rely on the United States for the fulfillment of its Constitutional Revolution."
Despite its efforts, however, Iran was not permitted a hearing at the Versailles peace conference. By all accounts, this was a great national disappointment. The records show that at Versailles the United States exerted strong pressure on behalf of Iran. But the British foreign minister, Lord Balfour, refused three successive requests from Secretary Lansing that Iran be given a hearing. Soon, the reason became clear for at this very time the British were negotiating in Tehran with the prime minister, secretly and personally, the so-called Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919.
From the viewpoint of Iranian foreign policy, World War I had several important consequences:
(1) The October Revolution restored the pre-1907 Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region, giving it an additional ideological dimension. Although Soviet Russia voluntarily abandoned the capitulatory privileges and the czarist claims and interests in Iran, it represented a powerful neighbor with a social system different from that of Iran.
(2) The emergence of the United States as the most powerful state in the world was to prove helpful for Iran because of American espousal of the principles of the "open door" and "self-determination" and the awakening American interest in Iranian affairs. At last, the United States, after 35 years of diplomatic contact with Iran and the experiences of World War I, had gained some insight into Iranian thinking and had arrived at a stage where its traditional policy of non-involvement in the political affairs of Iran was to be modified. America had realized that, among the Western states, it remained the only one in which Iran still had faith;
(3) The rapid decline of Britain relieved Iran of British intentions for a virtual protectorate; and most important
(4) The gradual revival of Iran was motivated by an intensified sense of nationalism demonstrated by the early abrogation of the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, with the open support of the United States.