Iran's Policy Towards the United States
by Ambassador Mahmoud Foroughi - Part 2
Symposium on Iran - Washington D.C. October 1977
THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS
It would be impossible, within the limited scope of this presentation, to cover adequately the foreign policy of Iran with respect to the vast and complex relationships that align' and hold together Iran and the United States today. This paper is confined to a review of isolated episodes, indicative of the main trends in the development of Iranian foreign policy towards the United States and to comments on the present situation. It is hoped that this will convey the contrast between the small beginnings and slow development of U.S.- Iranian relations, on the one hand, and their rapid expansion since 1953 to the enormous economic and strategic stakes involved today.
The first contact - The great Prime Minister Mirza Taqi Kilan Ainir Kabir was one of the first to realize the potential importance of America for Iran. He prepared the ground for the approach to the United States. However, unhappily for Iran, his life was cut short and he could not see the initial fruition of his far-sighted policy. In 1851, a draft treaty was negotiated between the American and Iranian envoys to the Sublime Porte at Constantinople. After the draft treaty was revised, in accordance with American wishes to include a "most favored nation" clause, the U.S. Senate gave its consent to ratification; but the treaty remained dormant and expired. Three years later, the American minister at Constantinople informed Washington of his understanding that the 1851 treaty has been blocked by Britain, though Russia was now promoting the renewal of negotiations. The minister reported that Iran was interested in buying American warships and obtaining the services of naval personnel. Early in 1855, an Iranian diplomat submitted to the American minister at Vienna a draft treaty which included provisions for the use of American naval forces to protect the Iranian merchant marine and certain islands and ports "from the preponderance" of an unnamed power.
Naturally, the United States could not accept Iran's request for intervention. Britain and Russia were engaged in the Crirnean War. America was preoccupied with the question of slavery and continental problems and was determined to avoid overseas entanglements. The United States desired the establishment of diplomatic relations primarily for the protection of its citizens in Iran and the possible promotion of commerce. These aims were made clear to Iran. In May-June 1855, the United States elicited and received Russia's promise to aid the U.S.-Iranian negotiations. However, the State Department cautioned the American minister at Constantinople to observe strict secrecy against the possibilities of sabotage by British or French agents.
Treaty of 1856 and establishment of legations (1883, 1888) - The successful conclusion of negotiations and the signature of the Treaty of Commerce and Friendship took place in Constantinople on 13 December 1856, though Russia had earlier withdrawn its support, probably because of American refusal to intervene in the Persian Gulf. The acceptance of America'sterms by Iran was reported to be closely related to the latter's negotiations with Great Britain for the conclusion of the Anglo~Iranian war over Herat.
President Buchanan proclaimed the treaty in August 1857. He urged the U.S. Congress to make the necessary appropriations for the establishment of a legation in Tehran. No action, however, was taken by Congress for the next quarter of a century. During the Kurdish raids of 1880-82 in northwest Iran, the United States was obliged, in the absence of an American envoy in Tehran, to request the good offices of the British government for the pr~ tection of the American missionaries in the disturbed area. This episode led to the opening of the American legation in Tehran early in 1883.
The first American minister, Samuel Benjamin, reported to Washington that Iran, in its anxiety to counteract Anglo-Russian domination, would welcome the introduction of American capital to exploit the untapped wealth of "coal, lead, copper, and petroleum." The U.S. government remained indifferent to tnese economic possibilities and petroleum was seldom mentioned again in the next 35 years.
Throughout this period, successive American envoys reported on the desire of the Iranian government to attract U.S. support, in various ways:
preparation of a plan for modernization of the country through American capital and know-how, construction of railroads, adoption of American educational methods and building of American-type schools, establishment of an oriental institute for dissemination of knowledge on Iranian affairs in the United States, employment of American technicians and advisers for the exploration and exploitation of mines, and purchase of Gatling guns. Several of these envoys recommended to their government one or more of these possibilities. However, the State Department maintained its "hands-off" policy. Its primary concern remained the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in Iran.
The first Iranian minister arrived in Washington in October 1888. He submitted to President Cleveland a confidential document, an interesting plea in a florid style. It expressed the wish of the government of Iran to modernize the country by improving agriculture, commerce, and industry through American know-how. It spoke of the increasing restraints imposed by Russia and Britain upon Iran and of the possible dangers for Iran of the loss of its independence. It expressed the fervent desire of the Iranian government to strengthen relations with America and requested the United States to safeguard Iran from Anglo-Russian aggression. However, the United States was not prepared to abandon its policy of non-involvement.
Protection of American citizens - Until the First World War, the main diplomatic concern of the United States in Iran was the protection of its citizens, most of which consisted of Protestant missionaries. Their presence caused some difficult problems for Iran because the authority of the central government was weak and the lines of communication in the country primitive.
The missionaries were located primarily in the northwest and western parts of the country where there was chronic foreign interference or occupation. These areas were also subject to the raids of Kurdish tribes which roamed freely across the Turkish-Iranian frontier. Moreover, amid these difficulties, the United States did not maintain diplomatic representation in Iran for a quarter of a century after the conclusion of the Treaty of 1856. Not until 1906 did the United States establish a consulate at Tabriz in northwest Iran. In the absence of American diplomatic representation, the United States sought the good offices of the British or Russian governments to protect the missionaries. Politically, this further complicated the relations between Iran and the Anglo-Russian powers.
The Iranian government, in line with its policy of trying to attract the political and economic support of the United States, did everything possible within its limited powers to accommodate the American missionaries. For instance, in connection with the murder of Reverend Benjamin Labarree, the Iranian government went so far in its efforts to meet the American demands for justice that a war was precipitated between Iran and Turkey, resulting in the Turkish occupation of some Iranian territory until the First World War.
The missionaries first came to Iran in l834. Gradually more arrived, altogether 50 or 60 families, and they expanded their activities into education, medicine, health, and welfare. Their proselytizing mission was confined primarily to the Christian and Jewish minorities; but whenever they tried to convert Muslims, inter-faith tensions arose.
The American missionaries made very important contributions to the development of Iran. They constructed not only chapels and churches but also hospitals, dispensaries, welfare centers, and schools, including the famous Alborz College. Many of them lived and died in Iran in the service of the people. The most renowned among them was the late Dr. Samuel Jordan whose name honors one of the principal streets of Tehran today.
It is not surprising, therefore, that prior to the First World War the United States enjoyed the psychological advantage of the humanitarian, sympathetic, and wholesome friendliness which the missionaries had created in lran.
The king, Nasseredin Shah, entertained liberal views towards the Christian and Jewish minorities. Mindful of the sensitivities of the United States, he showed special appreciation of the missionaries and authorized them to erect chapels and distribute their religious tracts and books. In 1851, he repealed a previous (1842) edict which had outlawed proselytizing among the Christians; in 1878 conversion of the Jews to Christianity was made legal. Missionary activities were gradually expanded in the fields of education and medicine.
A different, nonreligious aspect of the problem of protection of American citizens was concerned with those iranians who, having acquired American citizenship, had returned to Iran for business or other purposes. Taking advantage of American protection, some of them pursued questionable activities and, whenever in difficulty, they sought asylum with the American legation or consulates. Among them, the cases of Haji Sayyah and Mehran Baghdasarian became very well known; Haji Sayyah's entered textbooks on international law. The American envoys reported that these people had become naturalized Americans in order to take unfair advantage of U.S. protection in Iran and to avoid the true duties of citizenship. Because the Iranian government adamantly refused to recognize the rights of expatriation and asylum, the United States eventually made a distinction between native-born and naturalized American citizens in Iran. In 1901, the State Department issued a general warning to naturalized American citizens returnin" to Iran that the Iranian government probably would not recognize their acquired citizenship.
Constitutional Revolution (1906-10) - The Constitutional Revolution profoundly influenced the foreign policy of Iran. The Constitution conferred upon the Niajus important powers related to foreign affairs - the right of final approval of treaties and agreements, boundaries, financial matters, natural resources. and concessions.
The Constitutional Revolution was a nationalist movement. The deputies elected to the First and Second Majlis demonstrated a courageous sense of patriotism against great odds, even when confronted by the overwhelming power of the invading Russian armies. They rejected czarist threats and ultimatums and took the consequences of the Russian bombardment of the Majlis and the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza, and of the widespread massacres, looting. burning, and destruction perpetrated by the Russian armed forces.
As for Great Britain, within one year it lost the goodwill of the Constitutional Movement which it had gained by the extensive bast (asylum) it had provided in 1906 to the Constitutionalists in the compound of the British legation in Tehran. The goodwill was entirely dissipated because of the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 31 August 1907, which practically annihilated the independence of Iran. The two powers divided the country into spheres of influence, with the central desert area left as the 'neutral zone."
In terms of foreign policy, the Constitutional Movement, with its strict adherence to the concept of nationalism, pressed for total and complete independence. Under the circumstances of overwhelming Anglo-Russian domination. this policy proved unattainable. It deprived Iranian foreign policy of the maneuverability which might have compensated partially for Iran's lack of power. From an internal point of view, also, the Constitutionalists could do little to unify the divisive forces within the nation, who proved only too willing to serve the Anglo-Russian interests.
Throughout the period of Constitutional Revolution in Iran, the United States United States adhered to its policy of strict non-involvement in any dspect of Iranian politics. In June 1908, after Mohammad Ali Shah had launched his counter-revolution, the Constitutionalists appealed to the American minister to intercede with the shah on their behalf. The minister declined, stating that he had strict instructions not to intervene in the domestic affairs of Iran. The minister also rejected the requests of the Constitutionalists for asylum in the U.S. legation. In the opinion of one American observer, had the United States given some moral support to the Constitutionalists, there cuuld have been a legacy for the identification of America with the aspirations of the Iranian people. On the other hand, once the Constitutionalists had overthrown Mohammad Ali Shah and installed his young son, Sultan Ahmad Shah, on the throne, the United States recognized the regime in line with its established policy of de facto recognition.
The Morgan Shuster mission (1911) - The antecedents and negotiations pertaining to Morgan Shuster and the aftermath of his mission represented the first important issue in U.S.-Iranian relations that was unrelated to missionary problems. From the viewpoint of Iranian foreign policy, it was a serious attempt on the part of the Constitutional government to defy the domination of Britain and Russia. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had confronted Iran with formidable problems, primarily the impending loss of independence. Iran seemed to have no recourse except America, although the United States had repeatedly declined to intervene. As early as March 1908 the American minister in Tehran had reported to Secretary' of State Elihu Root that Iran wished to seek American advisers. The secretary brought the request to the attention of President Theodore Roosevelt and then made a sympathetic reply. However, this phase of negotiations soon came to an end because in June 1 908 the Russians bombarded the parliament building and dispersed the Majlis.
After the overthrow of Mohammad Ali Shah, the government resumed its efforts to gain American support. In June 1910, the Majlis, purposely sidestepping the financial provisions of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, passed legislation to seek a loan of $5 million from the United States, at seven-percent interest and to employ a foreign adviser for the Ministry of Finance. This request, however, seemed too serious for the United States to accept, for it might have been construed as interference with Anglo-Russian plans in Iran. The State Department had guessed rightly.
In September 1910, the Russian ambassador at Washington informed the State Department that his government and England would find the employment of an American adviser by Iran "inconvenient." He hoped that the United States would refuse the Iranian request, in recognition of the predominance of Russian and British interests in Iran.
Though the United States did not wish by any action to weaken its proclaimed "open door" policy, it believed that American interests in Iran were not of sufficient practical importance to warrant the displeasure of Britain and Russia. In return for this deference to Anglo-Russian wishes in Iran, the United States expected a reciprocal cooperative attitude on the part of those powers in regard to America's "open door" policy in China and, also, prospective American railroad interests in Turkey.
It is interesting to note that soon after this expectation of a quid pro quo had been conveyed to the British government, Britain and Russia indicated that they would no longer object to the recruitment of Americans for Iran but that they would maintain their positive control over Iranian affairs. In order to further assuage Britain, the State Department suggested to the American minister in Tehran that if British bankers with financial stakes in Iran should care to recommend American experts, the State Department would forward the names to the Iranian government. However, the American minister, after having consulted with the Iranian authorities, replied that Iran would welcome America and Americans but would reject advisers recommended by the British.
In December 1910, the Iranian minister at Washington was instructed to approach the State Department and obtain the services of a treasurer-general and assistants for Iran. President Howard Taft personally recommended Morgan Shuster for the post. This was consistent with the philosophy of "dollar diplomacy" which the president himself had initiated. After recruiting the American advisers, the State Department formally notified them that they were in the employ of the Iranian government and in no way represented the United States. Throughout the episode, the State Department did not veer from this attitude.
Morgan Shuster arrived in Iran on 12 May 1911. Within a month of his arrival, Shuster sought and obtained from Ihe Majlis, on 13 June 1911, a law which conferred upon the office of the treasurer-general "full complete powers in the handling of finances."
Meanwhile, Shuster, much to the surprise of the foreign colony in Tehran, succeeded in centralizing the fiscal structure and collecting sufficient revenues to cover government expenses, including the required installments on foreign debts.
The Anglo-Russian powers opposed the Shuster mission from its inception, though they did not 'wish to declare it openly at first, in view of the American expectation of a quid pro quo and President Taft's personal recommendation of Morgan Shuster. Britain and Russia opposed Shuster be cause he interpreted literally the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 in which those powers had pledged themselves to uphold Iran's sovereignty. He regarded himself as an employee of the Iranian government. Moreover, the mission symbolized the determination of the Majlis to effect financial reforms and emancipation in defiance of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The situation was intolerable, especially for Russia which had gained ascendency through the control of Iranian finances in 1900. ( continued part 3 )
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